Pragmatic Apparatus – The pragmatic foundations of non-derivative pluralism about reasons for belief

Cited by Lee Sonogan

Chapter Two Assimilation and Pluralism: From Immigrants to White Ethnic to  White Americans © Pine Forge Press, an imprint of Sage Publications, ppt  video online download

Abstract by Andrew Reisner

This paper offers a sketch of welfarist pluralism, a view that is intended to resolve a difficulty for non-derivative pluralists about normative reasons for belief. Welfarist pluralism is the view that all reasons for belief are rooted in wellbeing, and that wellbeing has as one of its components being in a positive epistemic state. The paper explores how this view can explain various pluralist intuitions and why it offers a plausible basis for combinatorial pluralists who believe that alethic and pragmatic reasons for belief combine to determine what one ought to believe. The paper also considers the relationship between theoretical rationality and wellbeing, and provides a partial argument for the derivative normativity of at least some requirements of theoretical rationality.

Publication: PhilPapers (Peer-Reviewed Journal)

Pub Date: 1 Nov, 2021 Doi:

Keywords: Ethics of belief  Reasons for belief  Pragmatism  Pluralism  Normativity  rationality  theoretical rationality  theoretical reasons  Epistemic normativity (Plenty more sections and references in this research article)

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